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Abstract 
 
Since Friedman, fundamental research in construction contract bidding and estimating has been 
concerned with the full problem definition, formulation and calibration.  The general problem 
definition is now virtually complete in that bidding involves sequential and simultaneous decisions to 
be made over time, under conditions of uncertainty, and with multiple, conflicting objectives.  Problem 
formulation has been rather haphazard and many ad hoc models have been used, often with very little 
empirical support.  A major reason for this appears to be the lack of any real rival to Friedman’s 
implicit theoretical base.  This paper examines the approaches and models used in research with a view 
to the ultimate development of some theory on the subject. 
 
Firstly, the relationship between bidding and estimating is considered along with the role of cost, price 
and other estimates.  Secondly, the criticisms of Friedman’s model are examined and in particular the 
efficacy of statistical models representing the various parts of the problem.  Finally, research n 
estimating accuracy is considered in terms of influencing factors and research methodology.  Key 
words: Bidding, estimating, statistical models. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
My experience of estimating and bidding (tendering) to date has been in two roughly equal phases.  
Firstly, as a student and practising quantity surveyor, in which I learned basic techniques and attempted 
to apply these in providing good service to clients.  Secondly, as a teacher and researcher, I have tried 
to develop the subject by critical analysis of the techniques and the way in which they seem to be 
employed.  This movement from practise to research seems to be quite common, in the UK at least, as 
the subject lends itself well to the usual perceived requirements of ‘scientific’ study (ie it involves 
numerical data) whilst seemingly providing a logical progression of knowledge acquisition over the 
years.  In my case, the combination of conventional wisdom required through practise and knowledge 
gained by systematic observation has usually created more problems than solutions. 
 
The major difficulty I think is the basic motivation for the research.  It is natural for practitioners to 
prefer applied research – the development of systems, techniques etc. which will improve performance 
or profits or both.  While pragmatic work of this type is undeniably valid, it is essentially incremental 
by nature and always relies on, and often prolongs the existence of, some assumptions about the 
problem under study.  If these assumptions are reasonable in some sense then I have no complaint.  On 
the other hand, if the assumptions are ill-founded then we have the makings of a different type of 
research, a research involving the identification, examination and testing of assumptions.   
Practitioners, in my experience, seldom distinguish between fact and opinion and tend to regard such 
research as at best naive and inconsequential, and at its worst destructive or vindictive.  Whilst not 
sharing this view myself, I nevertheless have suffered equally from assumptions of ‘blindness’.  
History has shown however that real progress in any field ultimately depends on the establishment of 
an explicit base.  Ideally this base consists of fundamental ‘truths’.  In reality, as far as we know, the 
best we can hope for is a stated set of laws, axioms, or propositions that have gained general 
acceptance.  To the best of my knowledge no such laws, axioms, or propositions exist or have existed 
in estimating and bidding, nor do there appear to be any serious attempts to work towards this goal. 
 
My good friend and advisor, the mathematician Dr Ernest Wilde, now Pro Vice Chancellor of Salford 
University, once suggested to me that the first 90% of the time spent on research projects was in having 
fun playing around with ideas and the last 10& of the time was the ‘serious bit’.  Whilst it will be a sad 
day when estimating and bidding research ceases to be fun, it is perhaps time that we started to think a 
little more about the serious bit yet to come. 
 
 
 
1.  What is Meant by Estimating an Bidding? 
 
People in the construction industry seem to have a clear impression of both these terms.  Estimating is 
the process of working out likely costs and bidding is the process of converting an estimate into a 
tender price.  People outside the industry have different ideas.  Statisticians, for example, understand 
estimating to be a collection of techniques for arriving at a figure (an estimator) to denote the value of 
some measure describing an (often hypothetical) very large population based on analysis of a sample of 
the population.  The importance of the subject for statisticians is in the ability of the estimator to 
accurately represent the unknown measure with a minimum degree of bias.  Bidding on the other hand 
is often associated with auctions in which beating the opposition is the primary objective.  The essential 
feature of most auction bidding is that the true value of the desired acquisition is uncertain or unknown, 
the behaviour of the bidder often being strongly influenced by the actions of competitors.  The card 
game of contract bridge is a typical example.  Here bids are made based on the system used by the 
players and taking into account the bids made or not made by the ‘opposition’, and the possible 
rewards and penalties that my ensue when the hand is eventually played out.  On the majority of 
occasions, bridge players make no direct attempt to count in advance the number of tricks that can be 
made, or work out a playing plan, during the bidding phase. They rely instead on well established rules 
combined with a knowledge of the risks involved. 
 
Applying these observations to the construction arena is easy enough.  If we substitute the construction 
contract bidder for the card player, then bidding is seen as a skill involving the consideration of many 
subtle and partially known factors, not least the actions of competitors, with a special regard to the risks 
involved.  That the rules or ethics of the construction contract ‘game’ do not normally allow bartering 
or repeated bidding does not significantly alter or simplify this position.  Bartering or repeated bidding 
actually provides more information to the bidder, making the risks potentially more calculable.  
Construction contract bidding does however involve a few more complexities than bridge bidding.  
Firstly, construction bidders are faced with multiple choices in that they may choose not to bid at all, or 
pretend to bid by taking ‘cover prices’, or offer non-price alternatives such as a reduced construction 
period.  Secondly, construction companies have multiple and conflicting objectives, such as meeting 
target profits or turnover, entering new markets, courting new clients etc.  Thirdly, contract bids often 
have to be made simultaneously rather than sequentially, the result of the bidding for contract A may 
not be known until after bids are entered for  contracts  B, C and D.  Fourthly, there are limits to the 
number of contracts that can be managed at any one time, bidders seek to obtain the best set of 
contracts.  This means the occurrence of future contract opportunities have to be taken into account. 
 
Seen in this way, the construct contract bidding problem invokes a mixture of feelings.  For the student, 
horror or resignation that he will never learn how to cope with the situation.  Indeed, if he relies on our 
present way of teaching of the subject, his fears are well justified.  The construction bidder’s reaction 
can range from satisfaction that his difficulties have been recognised (occasionally) to annoyance of the 
high sounding words used to describe common sense situation (frequently). The main difficulty for the 
researchers in this field is that the problem is not reduced to a simple enough form for a single 
comprehensive treatment, it also means having to learn a lot more about the problem itself. 
 
Despite trepidations, my own view as a researcher is that the problem is not insuperable.  Many 
techniques are already in existence to handle specific aspects.  Game theory for instance is well suited 
to the analysis of reactionary competitors, decision theory helps in situations of uncertain outcomes, 
operations research in optimising outcomes of simultaneous decisions, multicriteria decision making in 
resolving objectives, simulation in coping with intractable formulations, behavioural science in 
predicting human behaviour, and statistics and economics contain a host os valuable techniques for 
developing new approaches. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. The Role of Estimating 
 
In analysing the nature of the bidding problem, I am frequently reminded that estimating seems to get 
overlooked or regulated to a fairly trivial position in the overall picture.  This is not a deliberate effort 
on my part.  Indeed, I have a vested interest in promoting the importance of the estimating role in order 
to support our current research activities in this area.  My view of estimating is becoming increasingly 
aligned to that of the statistician, who spends most of his time examining potential models of the 
problem.  The business of estimation is left until the final stages of his work.  In terms of the total 
problem, the detailed study of estimation is essentially as esoteric exercise although it can sometimes 
lead to some striking insights into the nature of the problem itself.  An example of this is in the analysis 
by McCaffer (1976a) and several others of the impact of intensity of competition on estimation bias in 
bid forecasting.  By treating the estimate as a base line, it is possible to provide empirical evidence of 
underlying market influences on price levels which, in turn, can then be incorporated into models of the 
bidding problem. 
 
In the context of the construction contract bidding problem, estimation is clearly needed on several 
fronts.  Firstly, some estimate of the market price has to be obtained.  Secondly, estimates of the 
outcomes of decisions are needed to evaluate the changes in monetary, human, and other physical 
states both inside and outside the bidding organisation.  Thirdly, estimates of future contract 
opportunities are needed to identify potential contract portfolios. 
 
Estimates are also often independent.  Those with poor predictive properties for instance can lead to 
even poorer estimates in other parts of the system.  Risk analysis is essentially a means of informing 
these situations. 
 
Estimates are also needed of the characteristics of the estimates themselves – in statistical terms, the 
properties of the estimates. 
 
Estimating market price and changes in monetary states seems now to have acquired the general title of 
cost modelling a term which, although covering the activities of researchers who work in both fields at 
once, can lead to a mistaken belief that both kinds of estimation are essentially the same.  Contractors 
have always had a clear view of the separate and distinct roles of cost estimation and price estimation.  
The standard texts on cost estimation are consistent in exhorting the estimator to act independently of 
any perceptions he may have of the market price.  Market pricing is the function of the adjudicator.  
Although there is evidence, by Whittaker (1970) for instance, that cost estimators are sometimes 
influenced by market related events such as failure to obtain contracts, the phenomena does seem to be 
largely restricted to lesser experienced estimators.  The non-repetitive nature of most construction 
contracts (houses and factories excepted) means that a genuine pre-cost estimate is needed as a base 
line for market price calculations.  If the cost estimate already contains some implicit market 
allowances, it can only make adjudication that much more difficult. 
 
Turning to designers’, or engineers’, estimates as they are sometimes called, their task is clearly that of 
market price estimation.  All the current techniques used in performing this function utilise known and 
assumed relationships between characteristics of the design and the market price.  The most well 
known of these characteristics is the total floor area of a building which, together with the building 
type, provides a very good correlation with the market price.  Other important determinants of market 
price, such as the intensity of competition, seem to be used to a lesser degree.  The reason for this is 
probably due to the main interest of the designer being in the relative prices associated with different 
designs, so that non-design factors are taken to be constant.  This does seem to be a rather narrow view 
however as better ‘value for money’ may also be achievable be decisions taken outside the design 
domain.  Inviting more bids, open tendering, off-season procurement, simpler contract arrangements, 
enhancing the contract status etc. may all lower the market price, but are seldom contemplated.  The 
major problem is that current estimation techniques inadequately handle such issues.  Instead, there is a 
body of conventional wisdom in the industry that believes that more bids will produce false economies 
to the industry as a whole, owners want construction ‘now’, simpler contracts will result in more 
claims, interesting contracts will generate higher rather than lower prices.  Little of this ‘wisdom’ has 
been tested nor do any explicit models exist that even demonstrate the point.  Such models that do exist 
seem in fact to show the opposite to the conventional view. 
 
Newton (1987) has recognised the underlying fault with much of the work that has been done in cost 
modelling, and that is the failure to consider ‘purpose’ (the danger with treading the well worn path is 
that it might not actually be leading anywhere!), the lack of a suitable theoretical base, and the lack of 
criteria for assessment of different models.  He suggests that purpose may be established by analysis of 
the purpose of current models, which he believes to be that of ‘informing design’.  Like Newton, I 
think the lack of a theoretical base is the main difficulty, and I agree that the absence of assessment 
criteria does not help, but y analysis of the situation in the context of bidding suggests ‘informing 
design’ to be inappropriate and overrestrictive.  Cost modelling should in my opinion be ultimately 
concerned with the industry, and possibly beyond. 
 
3. Research in Bidding 
 
There is now a voluminous literature on bidding, most of which is applicable to construction contract 
bidding in some way, which has now become beyond the reading capacity of anyone recently entering 
the field.  Fortunately, some effort is now taking place to provide a classified review of the progress 
made to date, notably by Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1980) and King and Mercer (1988).  These 
classifications are based on the two main stream decision theoretic and game theortetic treatments 
together with various supplementary additions to cover additional features of what is seen as the ‘real 
world’ problem.  The increasing size of the supplementary sections suggests that a major rethink is 
needed  in the basic theory behind the techniques used. 
 
An appropriate point to start such a task is with what King and Mercer term the ‘basic probabilistic’ 
approach first introduced by Friedman (1956) in a seminal paper based on his PhD thesis – the first 
thesis on operations research to be produced in the USA.  Friedman proposed a method of calculating 
optimum bids for a series of contracts by utilising cost estimate/bid price ratios collected for the 
various competitors involved.  From frequency distribution of these ratios, Friedman estimated the 
probability of entering the lowest bid for a range of potential markup factors, taking the optimal 
markup to be the one which generated the largest probability/markup product.  Apart from Friedman’s 
method of estimating the probability of entering the lowest bid, a hotly disputed topic over the years, 
the technnique can be criticised for the several assumptions necessary for its application. 
 
Firstly, the model may not be a reasonable representation of reality.  This raises two issues.  (a) Are 
any factors of the problem missing?  There may be other decision variables than markup involved (eg. 
not bid at all, enter cover price, offer non-price features) or objectives other than maximising long term 
profit (eg. short term gains or losses), non monetary objectives may apply (eg. human welfare), time 
related aspects may be important (eg. cash flow, future contract opportunities), monetary and other 
constraints may exist. 
(b) How well do statistical models fit the factors?  Statistics, as all of mathematics, exists as a body of 
knowledge and techniques independent of the ‘real world’.  That it happens to mirror real world events 
rather well on many occasion is our good fortune.  There is no guarantee that cost estimates, actual 
costs, and competitors’ bids will nicely follow the statistical properties assumed.  The statistical 
requirements of complete randomness and , in Friedman’s model, independence are unattainable in 
practice.  The question is ‘how close is the fit?’ and then ‘how close is close enough?’. 
 
Secondly, the model may be difficult to calibrate.  This brings us back to estimating again.  Even if an 
acceptable model is developed, that is intuitively pleasing and accords with all the known factors, it 
may not be possible to estimate the values of the variables involved.  This particular difficulty comes in 
three interdependent parts.  (a) Data may be lacking.  The data demands of Friedman’s model is known 
to be heavy.  Many competitors’ bids and their associated cost estimates are needed to construct 
reliable frequency distributions.  (b) Techniques for converting data into usable information may not 
yet exist.  As has already been mentioned, there is some disagreement on the method of probability 
estimation.  (c)  The person making the bidding decision is not infallible.  Again Friedman’s method 
has frequently been misrepresented, even by experts.  Even with good data and good techniques, 
mistakes can still be made.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Several attempts have been made  to improve on Friedman’s method in answer to the criticisms made.  
One of these tries to incorporate more subjective objectives by replacing monetary values with utility 
values (Willenbrock, 1972, for instance) so bringing the subject into line with what is now known as 
decision analysis.  The major problem with using utilities is that stable preferences seldom seem to 
exist and, mainly because of this, decision analysis is now generally regarded as being a theoretical 
novelty rather than a robust practical technique. 
 
Another approach, initiated by Hanssmann and Rivett (1956), tries to reduce the data load by 
considering only the bids of the lowest competitors.  Unfortunately, in reducing the amount of data 
used, this approach also equally reduces the power of the method by omitting relevant data.  Another 
data reducing approach involves further assumptions of the statistical model used by taking the bidding 
patterns of competitors to follow some convenient probability distribution such as the normal 
distribution.  Whilst this is a device often used by applied statisticians when using robust techniques 
such as the t-test or analysis variance, when even major deviations from the normal assumption are 
known to have little effect on the analysis, it is not known yet what the effect of this assumption may 
be on bidding models. 
 
More recent work has developed these latter ideas in considering the efficacy of current statistical 
models and their extension into other aspects of the bidding problem (Skitmore, 1986).  This work 
considers the application of statistical models to the three primary features of construction bidding; 
contract opportunities, decision outcomes, and competitors’ bidding patterns. 
 
4. Efficacy of statistical models 
 
Contract Opportunities 
 
The frequency of the size of contract opportunities was found by Hossein (1977) to be closely 
modelled by the exponential distribution, although Skitmore’s (1986) analysis found a lognormal 
distribution to be more appropriate.  The number of competing bidders has been suggested by 
Friedman 91956) to follow poisson distribution (Skitmore found a three parameter lognormal fit to be 
better), with an average derived by a regression analysis on contract size, an approach investigated by 
Wade and Harris (1976) who found a logarithmic relationship between the number of bidders and 
contract value.  Others have questioned this latter approach as providing very poor predictive results 
(Gates, 1967), sometimes finding no relationship at all (Sugrue, 1977), or subject to the influence of 
market conditions (Skitmore, 1981).  Such lack of predictive models has lead researchers to conduct 
simulation studies based on a randomised number of bidders (Rickwood, 1972).  Finally the identify of 
competitors has been treated probabilistically by a predictive technique termed the multidistribution 
model (MD) which “…represents the local structure of the construction industry, a structure which 
allows the contractor to predict with a high level of confidence who is competitors will be on a specific 
project”  (Shaffer and Micheau, 1971, p.116).  Details of this model are apparently given in Casey and 
Shaffer (1964), a publication to which this writer has been unable to gain access.  A method has been 
used by Skitmore (1986) however by means of regression analysis to predict the probability that a 
specific competitor will enter a bid.   
 
Decision outcomes 
 
Whilst no probabilistic approaches to modelling human factors have yet been attempted, many 
researchers have tackled the monetary aspects of the problem.  Monetary aspects are dependent on two 
major factors, the probability of acquiring the contract and the probability of the occurrence of certain 
monetary states conditional on the contract being acquired.  This later aspect is considered here in 
terms of anticipated expenditure (cost) and anticipated income.   
 
Several attempts have been made to formulate the problem in a quantitative manner, which allows 
treatment of the variation between expenditure and estimates.  One approach adopts the concept of a 
‘true’ cost (Whittaker, 1970), sometimes known as “God’s cost” (McCaffer, 1976a) or, perversely, as 
the “Devil’s” cost (Fine, 1974).  This is essentially Friedman’s (1956) approach in taking the view that 
the true cost can only be known after the event, and assumes that the distribution of the ratio’s’ of the 
true cost to the estimated cost can be ascertained from the contractor’s records.  A different perspective 
is provided by McCaffer (1976b) whose model is derived on the basis that different estimators will 
assess the effects of factors on casts differently and hence a number of estimators are liable to produce 
a range of estimated costs, suggesting a probability distribution of estimates around some mean.  This 
mean has been termed the ‘likely cost’ (Cauwelaert and Heynig, 1979) and several simulation studies 
(Fine and Hackemar, 1970; Rickwood, 1972: Morrison and Stevens, 1980, for instance) have been 
conducted on this basis.  The advantage of the likely cost approach is that each contract cost estimate 
can be considered to be a random value drawn from a distribution of possible cost estimates unique to 
each project, whilst Friedman’s approach implies one distribution to apply irrespective of any non-
random differences that may occur between contracts.  This, according to Benjamin (1969) is an 
important factor for, in his view; there is no single distribution of the ratio of true to estimated cost that 
applies to all contracts without regard to the characteristics of that contract.  An alternative line is to 
consider actual costs to be distributed about the estimated costs, this distribution being regarded by 
Vergara (1977) as symmetrical with actual costs equal on average to estimated costs. 
 
The difference between the ‘true’ versus ‘likely’ cost models is essentially that some authors consider 
estimated costs as a random variable and the true cost as fixed whilst others take the true cost as being 
random and estimated cost to be fixed.  A more fruitful approach is to treat both the costs and the 
estimates as random variables (as do Fuerst, 1977, and Rothkopf, 1980).  There is some justification in 
this for, as Fine and Hackemar (1970) have demonstrated, variability in estimates of production and 
costs exists both before and after the event as accounts are guesses at past costs just as much are 
estimates guesses at future costs! 
 
Some authors have criticised the use of statistical models of estimated costs on the grounds that such 
estimates depend on company position (Curtis and Maines, 1973), or they are conditioned by the work 
content of the project (Ortega-Reichert, 1968), they are dependent on the combination of contracts 
obtained (Stark and Mayer, 1971).  Nevertheless, construction costs have frequently been modelled in 
this way, usually by the ratio of actual to estimated costs.  Table 1 summarises some of the work that 
has been reported. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1  Distribution parameters for costs/estimates 
 
 
Modeller   Shape  Spread   Location 
 
Barnes (1971)h     cv 5.8% 
Barnes & Lau (1974)a    cv 4-15% 
Beckmann (1974) a  Normal 
Beeston (1974)g     cv 4% 
Capen et al (1971)a  Lognormal 
Case (1972)c 
Cauwelaert & Heynig (1979)a Uniform  + A% 
Fine (1974)b   Uniform  + 10% 
Fine & Hackemar (1970)b  Uniform  + 8-10% 
Friedman (1956)c   Gamma 
Gates (1967)d   Normal  cv 7.5% 
Greismer et al (1967)a  Uniform  
Hackemer (1970)b    + 5-15% 
Harris & McCaffer (1983)a Uniform  + A% 
Leech & Earthrowl (1972)c Lognormal  
Liddle (1979)a     + 5% 
Mitchell (1979)a   Normal   
Morin & Clough (1969)c  Symmetrical cv 2%  1.0 (median) 
Morrison & Stevens (1980)a   + 5-7 ½ (mean) 
Moyles (1973)f     + 5% 
Naert & Weverberg (1978)i     close to 1 
Oren & Rothkopf (1975)a  Weibull 
Park (1966)a     + 5% 
Rickwood (1972)b  Normal 
Rothkopf (1969)a   Weibull    1.0 (exp. Val) 
Rothkopf (1980)a   Weibull 
Rubey & Milner (1966)a    less than 10% 
Smith & Case (1975)c  Lognormal 
Smith & Case (1975)c  Loglogistic 
Vickery (1961)a   Uniform 
Whittaker (1970)a  Uniform 
Willenbrock (1972)j      + 3% 
 
 
a assumed for theoretical purposes 
b assumed for simulation purposes 
c source of data unknown 
d analysis of 110 USA road projects 
e analysis of 153 UK construction project 
f opinion survey of UK contractors 
g analysis of extent of agreement between UK construction estimators 
h analysis of 160 British construction projects 
I discussion with Dutch construction companies 
j analysis of 20 USA road projects 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At a more detailed level, random variables have been said to include: labour costs (Benjamin, 1969; 
Fine, 1970; Gates, 1971; Bennett and Fine, 1980; Bennett and Ormerod, 1984; Wilson, 1982, among 
many); material costs (Benjamin, 1969; Armstrong, 1972); subcontractors’ costs (Benjamin, 1969); 
quantity related costs (Fine and Hackemar, 1970; Gates, 1971; Grinyer and Whittaker, 1973); effects of 
weather and seasons (Benjamin, 1969; Armstrong, 1972; Hillebrandt, 1974); costs of estimating (Leech 
and Jenkins, 1978); additional costs (Gates, 1971); and other costs such as insurance, bonding, fringe 
benefits (Benjamin, 1979). 
 
Income is normally assumed to be some function of the value of the bid, the majority of modellers 
assuming a one to one relationship.  It is clear however that such an assumption is far from realistic in 
construction contract bidding as many factors influence changes between the bid value and the income 
ultimately received.  Most of the factors are dealt with on a contractual basis, remuneration often being 
provided for unpredicted events such as inflation, additional work caused by fire and flood, and 
quantity errors and delays outside the company’s control.  Further income may accrue outside the 
contractual position in the form of ex gratia payments for perhaps exceptionally inclement weather, 
interest received on invested capital, receipts from the leasing of advertising space on hoardings etc.  
Of these variations in income only one factor, the incidence of design changes, has been modelled 
statistically. 
 
Profit however is another matter.  Estimates of profit are invariably taken as the difference between the 
bid and the cost estimate, usually in percentage terms, and the probability distribution of profit as the 
difference between the bid (a constant) and cost (a variable).  It is clear though that the probability 
distribution of profit is the difference between the two variables, income and expenditure, and is often 
best left in this disaggregated form particularly when modelled over time. 
 
Such models of income and expenditure over time, or cash flow models, tend to be deterministic 
however.  Atkins (1975) for instance has used deterministic models to represent the “cash flow 
patterns” for several differing project sizes and types.  The only probabilistic model known to date is 
that by Kangari and Boyer (1981) in the form of a beta distribution. 
 
Competitors’ bidding patterns 
 
As with decision outcomes, the use of statistical models to describe the bidding patterns of competitors 
has met with some criticism from several quarters.  One criticism is that the events taking place are not 
truly random in the classical statistical sense as the data are not generated from repeated measures of 
the same experiment – each bidding event is unique (Benjamin, 1972).  Another criticism is that the 
assumption of randomness is invalidated by the presence of many subjective factors influencing 
bidding behaviour (Curtis and Maines, 1974).  A further criticism is of the basic assumption that 
competitors will follow the same general bidding patterns in the future as they have in the past (Park, 
1962).  An individual competitor may for instance change his strategy, ‘rendering past data about him 
misleading’ (Beeston, 1983). 
 
All of these criticisms are essentially concerned with the random assumption contained in statistical 
models and the existence of several techniques to test this assumption suggests that the validity or 
otherwise of the criticisms may be resolved empirically.  Apart from McCaffer (1976a), who conducted 
a time series analysis of individual bidders to ascertain trends, surprisingly little work has been done in 
this respect.  Unfortunately, McCaffer’s results, although suggesting that some contractors behave in a 
manner not entirely consistent with the random model, were thought to be generally inconclusive and 
further work is urgently needed in this area. 
 
Despite these criticisms, competitive behaviour has been modelled statistically by many researchers.  
These models classify neatly into collective and individual models of competitors.  One approach to 
estimated costs (Larew, 1976), true costs (Rothkopf, 1980; Rickwood, 1972) or that estimated costs are 
similar (Broemser, 1968) or vary around some common mean (Oren and Roghkopf, 1975; Morrison 
and Stevens, 1980), and that the markup component of bids is a random variable.  This allows the 
ration of ‘our’ cost estimate to competitors’ bid to have some direct meaning.  Empirical evidence 
however does not support this supposition, Grinyer and Whittaker (1973) finding markups to vary very 
little between firms (6.8%+ 0.35%) although a similar analysis of Shaffer and Micheau’s (1971) data 
and Skitmore’s (1986) data revealed a rather larger 5.40% (1.84 standard deviation) and 5.57% (2.25 
standard deviation) respectively, none of which are sufficient to account for a general coefficient of 
variation of around 5 to 9% for whole bids.  For most purposes, assumptions about the nature of bid 
components are unnecessary, and the distribution of bids alone is of interest.  Table 2 summarises some 
of the models found in the literature. 
 
A little work has been carried out on the changing nature of these bid distributions.  McCaffer (1976a), 
Johnston (1978), and Skitmore (1987) seem to have detected a relationship between market conditions 
and distribution shape, whilst McCaffer (1976a), Skitmore (1981a), Morrison (1884) and Flanagan and 
Norman (1985) claim to have found a negative correlation between spread and contract value. 
Again, further work is needed in this area. 
 
The distribution of low bids has been modelled by the winning bid/cost estimate ratios (Ackoff and 
Sasieni, 1968; Sugrue, 1977, 1980) or the winning bid/estimated contract value ratios (Hanssmann and 
Rivett, 1959).  These ratios are often assumed to follow a normal distribution (Ackoff and Sasieni, 
1968; Sugrue, 1980), an assumption tested empirically by Beeston (1983) and Sugrue (1977) with 
confirmatory results.  A slightly different version by Sasieni et al (1959) considers the ratio (B_K)/K, 
where B is the winning bid and K the cost estimate, to also follow a normal distribution.  An interesting 
feature of lowbid/cost estimate ratios is that their mean tends to be very close to unity (Skitmore, 
1986), a fact that lends 
Table 2  Distribution parameters for bids 
 
 
Modeller   Shape   Spread   Location 
 
AICBOR (1967)o      cv 6.8% 
Alexander (1970)d  Normal   
Arps (1965)d   Lognormal 
Barnes (1971)m      cv 6.5% 
Beeston (1971)I   Pos. skewed  cv 5.2-6% 
Brown (1966) d   Lognormal 
Capen et al (1971)d  Lognormal 
Cauwelaert & Heynig (1979)a Uniform   
Cauwelaert & Heynig (1979)g Normal 
Crawford (1970)d   Lognormal 
Dougherty & Nozaki (1975)d Gamma 
Emond (1971)d   Normal 
Fine & Hackemar (1970)b  Uniform   cv 5% 
Friedman (1956)a   Gamma 
Grinyer & Whittaker (1973)c Uniform   cv 6.04% 
Hossein (1977)k   Gamma 
Klein (1976)a   Lognormal 
McCaffer (1976a)f  Normal   cv 6.5% 
McCaffer (1976a)n  Normal   cv 7.5% 
McCaffer (1976a)j  Normal   cv 8.4% 
McCaffer & Pettit (1976)j  Pos. skewed  cv 8.4% 
Mitchell (1977)a   Normal   
Morrison & Stevens (1980)a Normal   19.1% av. range 
Oren & Rothkopf (1975)a  Weibull 
Park (1966)h   Pos. skewed   
Pelto (1970)d   Lognormal 
Shaffer & Micheau (1971)p    cv 7.65% 
Skitmore (1981a)l     cv 7.65% 
Skitmore (1986)q   Normal   cv 6.8% 
Skitmore (1986)r   3 param lognormal cv 13.5% 
Skitmore (1986)s   3 param lognormal cv 7.8% 
Weverberg (1982)a  Lognormal 
Whittaker (1970)c  Uniform      1.068 
 
 
a Assumed for theoretical purposes 
b Analysis of an ‘adequate’ sample of UK construction contracts 
c Analysis of 153 UK Government construction contracts 
d USA oil and mineral tracts – source of data unknown 
e Assumed for simulation studies 
f Analysis of 183 Belgian building contracts 
g “Consistent with work of other researchers” 
h USA construction projects – source of data unknown 
I Large sample of PSA building contracts 
j  
k Analysis of 545 US civil engineering and 63 mechanical engineering contracts 
l Analysis of 269 UK building contracts 
m Analysis of 159 UK construction contracts 
n Analysis of 16 Belgian bridges contracts 
o Analysis of 213 UK motorway contracts 
p Analysis of 50 USA construction contracts 
q Analysis of 51 UK construction contracts 
r Analysis of 218 UK local authority construction contracts 
s Analysis of 373 UK construction contracts 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
Some substance to the argument that ‘cost’ estimates may be closely related to market price estimates. 
 
Models of collective bidding behaviour have been criticised for neglecting the inherent competitive 
advantage of some companies in differential relative efficiencies of production or estimating 
differential relative efficiencies of production or estimating abilities.  Several researchers have 
modelled individual bidders, starting with Friedman (1956) and including Taylor (1963) and Morin and 
Clough (1969).  The approaches are similar to that of modelling competitors collectively in that 
competitors’ bid/cost estimates ratios are obtained and probability density functions fitted to the 
ensuing frequency distributions (Friedman, 1956; Taylor, 1963; Benjamin, 1972, for instance).  
Beeston (1982) has suggested using D ratios, in a similar manner to Sasieni et al, where D + {(lowest 
bid – estimated cost)/estimated cost} expressed as a percentage.  Morin and Clough (1969), on the 
other hand, have used the relative frequencies of competitors’ bid/cost estimate to won bid/cost 
estimate ratios. 
 
Whilst al of the distribution parameters postulated for collective models necessarily apply to individual 
bidders, some modellers have proposed probability distributions specifically for the individual case.  
Griesmer et al (1967) assume bidders draw from a uniform distribution unique to each, and Winkler 
and Brookes (1980) have proposed models in which differing amounts of information (ie different 
variances) exist between bidders.  Capen et al (1971), Curtis and Maines (1973) and Fuerst (1977) have 
attempted to derive parameter estimates for each bidder by simulation techniques, and Weverbereg 
(1982) has used a multivariate technique to estimate parameters of coalition bidding for oil leases, 
assuming the winning bid to be a constant.  This latter approach has been developed by Skitmore 
(1986) as a means of both parameter estimation and significance testing via analysis of variance, 
showing that individual bidders do have different relative means and variances when modelled in this 
way. 
 
Further considerations involve the independence assumption; factors influencing individual bidding 
behaviour such as changing market conditions (Whittaker, 1970; de Neufville et al, 1977; Carr and 
Sandahl, 1978; Park, 1980, for instance), contract characteristics (Christenson, 1965; Broemser, 1968; 
Benjamin, 1972; de Neufville et al, 1977; Sugrue, 1971; Carr and Sandahl, 1981; Morin and Clough, 
1969) such as the class of construction (Morin and Clough, 1969; Shaffer and Micheau, 1971; Coke, 
1981), contract size (McCaffer, 1976a; Harvey, 1979; Lange, 1973), and geographical location (Pelto, 
1971; Harvey, 1979), the number of competitors (Benjamin, 1970; McCaffer, 1976a; Pelto, 1971; 
Harvey, 1979), the “make-up” of competitors (Carr and Sandahl, 1978); responsive actions of 
competitors, ie game theory (Griesmer and Shubik, 1963a, 1963b, 1963c; Griesmer et al (1967; 
Wilson, 1969; Rothkopf, 1969, 1980a, 1980b; Oren and Rothkopf (1975); Smith and Case, 1975; 
Knode and Swanson, 1978; Palfrey, 1980); the degrading effects of time (Morin and Clough, 1969); 
collusion (Mitchell 1977; Sheldon, 1982); and non-serious and unrealistic bids (Whittaker, 1970; 
Moyles (1973); Pim, 1974; McCaffer, 1976a; Johnston, 1978; Weverberg, 1981; Beeston, 1983). 
 
5. Research in estimating 
 
Research in estimating construction costs and prices has proceeded largely independently of research in 
bidding, the major emphasis being on systems development.  Raftery (1987) has classified these 
developments into what he terms first, second and third generation models.    First generation models 
are said to be characterised by the procedural approach typified by (design) elemental ‘cost’ planning, 
relying on a data bank of ‘cost’ analyses obtained by the analysis of priced bills of quantities and used 
in a “mathematically naive” way as a guide to market price estimation.  Second generation models 
involve the intensive use of multiple regression analysis in investigation the use of linear models for 
market price forecasting.  Third generation models are said to be knowledge based and attempt to 
incorporate some measure of expert judgement in the forecasting process.  Whilst Raftery’s typology 
does reflect the general trend in the literature relating to market price forecasting, it is by no means 
agreed that each generation represents an improvement on the last, but rather a series of attempts to hit 
the pot of gold by the application of some likely looking techniques. 
  
It has been argued, correctly, that estimating requires a good structure or theory before any real 
progress can be made.  Unfortunately, research has yet to reveal the nature of such a structure.  Current 
opinions seem to be polarised into the resource based approach and the design based approach, and a 
reconciliation of these two schools is well overdue.  Such a reconciliation seems possible through the 
more broader considerations of bidding research. 
  
Unlike estimating research, bidding research does have a history does have a history of innovation and 
controversy resulting in a wealth of empirical data relating to its central issues.  Moreover, biding 
research, subsuming as it does, cost and price estimating, is likely to provide the framework from 
which theories of estimation may emerge.  On the other hand however, it is possible that empirical data 
derived from estimating research may help in the development of bidding theories. The problem 
meanwhile of course is to know just what data to collect that may be relevant to the problem, and this si 
reflected in the empirical work to date. 
 
Perhaps the easiest question to answer on estimating is what constitutes a good estimate?  This must 
ultimately concern the accuracy of the estimate, the cost of achieving this accuracy, and the trade off 
between the two – an optimisation problem – within the context of the estimating situation.  Several 
factors have emerged regarding one part of this relationship – accuracy, and its influencing factors.  
Although some of these factors, such as the amount of information used in preparing the estimate, will 
have cost consequences, we have not yet reached the stage of quantifying these costs.  Many other 
factors however do not involve any substantial cost considerations. 
 
7. Factors affecting estimating accuracy 
 
Two methods have been applied to the analysis of factors affecting accuracy in estimating (a) 
retrospective analysis of existing data files, and (b) experimental work.  The usual approach has been to 
calculate the ratios of estimate to lowest bid, in the manner first adopted in bidding research (eg. 
Hanssmann and Rivett, 1959), and to measure the strength of association of these ratios with any other 
variables of interest.  With very few exceptions, the work has been aimed at designers’ estimation of 
market prices.  The factors associated with estimating accuracy fall into four categories (1) the market 
(2) the information available (3) the technique used, and (4) the estimator himself. 
 
Market factors 
 
The construction contract market has four major characteristics – the product (building type and size), 
the procurement system (client, tendering system, contractual arrangements, documentation system), 
the geographical location of the product, and the nature of the competition for the contract. 
 
The type of project has been found to be associated with estimating accuracy by several researchers.  
McCaffer 91976a) found statistically significant differences between the mean ratios for a total of 300 
Belgian road contract and building contract estimates.  Harvey (1979) found similar differences 
between a total of 2401 Canadian building, non-building, special trades, and other contracts.  Morrison 
and Stevens (1980) also found differences between the mean ratios for a total of 648 UK school, 
housing and other contracts.  Skitmore’s (1985) experimental work with 12 estimators in the UK again 
found significant differences between early stage estimates for a school, housing, factory, offices and 
health centre contracts. 
 
Wilson et al (1987) found significant differences between mean ratios for a total of 408 Australian 
public works contracts when divided into value ranges of less that $A50000, $A50000-$A250000, and 
over $A250000.  Harvey also found a trend with mean ratios tending toward unity (ie more accurate 
estimates) for larger contracts, the best fit being the square of the inverse of the contract value.  Other 
workers, notably by McCaffer 91976a) and Morrison and Stevens 919800 have found less conclusive 
results. 
 
No research has yet been done to test the relationship between estimating error and the type of client, or 
general procurement method except for Wilson et al who claim to have found significant differences 
between contracts with and without the provision of bills of quantities. 
 
Harvey’s (1979) analysis of variance showed significant differences in mean ratios across the six 
Canadian regions studied.  Significant regional/project type interactions were also found. 
 
The nature of the competition has been studied at two levels.  Firstly, the number of  competitors 
bidding for the project, has on many occasions (McCaffer, 1976a; De Neufville, Hani and Lesage, 
1977; Harvey, 1979; Hanscomb and Associates, 1984;  Runeson & Bennett, 1983; Skitmore and Tan, 
1988) been found to have a significant negative correlation with the low bid/estimate ratios (ie 
estimates are too low with few bidders and too high with many bidders).  Strangely, this trend has also 
been found using mean bid/estimate ratios (McCaffer, 1976a; Runeson & Bennett, 1983), and even 
with highest bid/estimate number of bidders relationship is so striking that reserchers have sometimes 
tried to fit a curved relationship (Harvey, 1980; Hanscomb, 1984), the inverse number of bidders 
seeming the most appropriate (Harvey, 1980).  This latter relationship coincides well with the statistical 
models of bidding distributions which imply a curved trend to this, although the mean and high bid 
trends are not anticipated.  Some theoretical developments are clearly needed to accommodate this. 
 
Work at the second level of competitive states has been concentrated on analysis over time, usually on 
a yearly basis.  Morrison and Stevens (1980) found the modulus ratios to be much larger between 
1973-75, a period of much uncertainty in the UK construction industry.  De Neufville, Hani and Lesage 
91977) also found differences between what they term “good” and “bad” years in the USA (good and 
bad contractors).  The results of this analysis show that underestimates and overestimates are generally 
associated with good and bad years respectively. 
 
Informational factors 
 
The level of information available to the estimator increases as the design progresses.  The effect of 
increasing information can therefore be assessed by comparing the accuracy of estimates made in the 
early stages of design (conceptual estimates) with those made when the design is substantially 
complete (detailed estimates).  A comprehensive review of the general accuracy expected for these two 
types of estimates has been made by Ashworth and Skitmore (1983) indicating a standard deviation of 
15 to 20 percent for detailed estimates.  Two experimental studies, by Jupp and McMillan 91981) for 
detailed estimates and Skitmore (1985) for conceptual estimates, have been conducted aimed at 
quantifying the incremental effect of information on estimating accuracy. 
 
Jupp and McMillan observed the effect of increasing levels of historical price data on the estimating 
accuracy of three quantity surveyors.  The results of this exercise indicated that estimating accuracy 
improved only slightly with the increasing information.  Skitmore’s experiment involved the provision 
of increasing amounts of information about the contract to be estimated in addition to price information 
relating to similar past contracts.  In this study the use of past contract data was found to have no 
significant effect on accuracy levels.  The provision of current contract information produced an 
increase in average estimate levels form –5.63 percent error (18.28 standard deviation) with one piece 
of information to 11.13 percent (14.59 standard deviation) with all of the 16 pieces of information 
provided.  A closer analysis of the data however indicated that the subjects claiming a greater expertise 
made far less use of the information provided in terms of improved accuracy.  These subjects were also 
able to estimate far more accurately, as is noted later.  This propensity for experts to use less overt 
information has also been found in other behavioural studies (eg Silva & Regan, 1988). 
 
Another study by Bennett (1987) investigated the reliability of data sources by an experiment involving 
eight subjects pricing fifty items of building work four times, using a different standard price books on 
each occasion.  The eight prices received for each item using each book were examined and awarded a 
score on a scale of 0 to 8, where 0 indicated that all the prices were identical, 1 a marginal variation, 2 
one serious error, 4 two serious errors, 6 three serious errors, and 8 four serious errors.  The resulting 
totals for each book show a marked difference between accuracy measured in this way, with one book 
considerably outperforming the others. 
 
Technical factors 
 
The standard estimating texts assert that  more detailed estimating techniques such as those using 
approximate quantities are ipso facto necessarily more accurate than more coarser techniques such as 
the floor area method.  Apart from the two limited informational studies mentioned above, very little 
research has been attempted in establishing the validity of this. 
 
One study (James, 1954), has compared the accuracy of the cube, floor area, and storey enclosure 
methods of estimating in terms of the number of estimates falling inside a rand of +10% or +20%.  The 
results turn out to be statistically significant (chi-square 5.99, 2df), with the storey enclosure mehtod 
being better than the cube method. 
 
Measures of accuracy for the various multiple regression methods have also received little press.  Most 
of the work is in the form of academic theses and a review is currently in progress.  One work of 
particular interest is that of Ross (1983) in which three methods of approximate quantities estimating 
were examined in terms of accuracy Ross’ first method uses the simple average of the value of sections 
of work from a set of bills of quantities or previous contracts.  The second method uses a regression 
procedure to predict total value form sectional values, and the third method uses a regression on the 
unit value of items.  Thus the methods are generally arranged in order of increasing usage of 
information.  Ross’ results indicate the first method to be the most accurate (cv 24.50 percent), 
followed by the second method (cv 30.49 percent) and the third method (cv 52.66 percent), which 
suggests that the more sophisticated methods utilising more of the data available produced less accurate 
results. 
 
Human factors 
 
One of the factors emerging form Jupp and McMillan’s (1981) research on informational effects was 
claimed to be the marked difference between the accuracy levels of the subjects employed in the 
studies, though little supporting evidence is available.  Morrison and Stevens (1980) also seemed to 
find some association between groups of quantity surveyor estimators and accuracy levels, although it 
was not clear how much of the observed effect was confounded by the type and size of contract. 
 
Skitmore’s (1985) experiments provided clear evidence of significant differences in estimating 
accuracy between the individual surveyors involved.  Although handicapped by the limited amount of 
data collected in this study, it was possible to tentatively conclude that the most consistent estimators 
were associated with high recall abilities, self-professed expertise, low mental imaging of the physical 
characteristics of the building, and high general and specific contract estimating experience.  Low 
estimates were also found to be associated with self-professed expertise and high estimates with high 
recall abilities, high mental imaging and specific project experience.  In addition, subjects exhibiting 
the greatest expertise were generally thought to be (a) more relaxed and confident (b) more concerned 
with maintaining familiarity with the market and overall price levels than other who believed the 
routine collection and careful analysis of project information to be of major importance, and (c) 
possibly able to recall the overall price of the projects undertaken. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Research in bidding and estimating is progressing on three levels – systems, techniques, and models.  
The usefulness of any system or assumptions, contained therein.  Ultimately, we would hope for a 
general model expressed in terms of well established laws, axioms, or propositions upon which future 
systems and techniques may be developed.  The task of fundamental research is to produce such a 
model. 
 
The most important contribution to the modelling of bidding decisions was the first operations research 
approach of Friedman in 1956 who used a statistical model to represent bid/estimate quantity lies in its 
representation of the relationship between estimates of resource costs, or market prices, or some 
mixture of the two, and the other values of interest such as individual or collective competitors’ bids, or 
the lowest bid itself.  The research that has been done to date indicates that the distribution of bid/cost 
estimate ratios (Table 10 and bid/price estimate ratios (Table 2) is not sufficiently stable to justify any 
sophisticated applications such as that suggested by Friedman.  Current work aimed at refining our 
understanding of the nature of the ratios and influencing factors seems to offer a possible way through 
this difficulty.  It also seems likely that additional benefits may result in the development of some 
simple debiasing techniques for estimators (Beeston, 1988). 
 
It is instructive to not that the many criticisms of Friedman’s general proposals have been instrumental 
in furthering work in the bidding problem.  Questions concerning the comprehensiveness of his model 
have led to the consideration of many other relevant factors, and difficulties in calibration have led to 
the consideration of the nature of estimation generally.  There are signs however that the impetus 
provided by Friedman is beginning to dissipate.  His model is now looking very outdated and the 
absence of an adequate alternative is inhibiting empirical work in the field.  What seems to be needed is 
some theoretical base from which empirically testable hypotheses can be proposed.  It may be that 
sufficient knowledge already exists to enable a theory to emerge. If so, it really is time to ‘get serious’. 
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